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BOOK REVIEWS
THE STATE LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTION. By Jefferson B. Fordham.' Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1959. Pp. 109.2
We have been urged frequently and cogently to recognize that law
today emanates more from the legislative than from the judicial
process.3 But, outside a course or two in "Legislation," lawyers and
law schools probably still pay insufficient attention to the process of
law-making in representative bodies. Only if drawn into lobbying
activities on some client's behalf or if lured into political actions extracurricular to their legal practice do most lawyers come into close
contact with state legislatures. It is therefore heartening that,
throughout his three lectures, Professor Fordham points to the importance of state legislative processes and institutions as sources of
law. His concern, furthermore, is purportedly more broad-gauged
than the practicing lawyer's concern with the content of statute law.
He starts from the premise that American state legislatures can do
their job rationally and effectively only if they are given an appropriate structure and power proportionate to their great responsibilities
as vital lawmaking agencies.
His list of specific recommendations for thus equipping them is a
long one, adding up, as he says, to a "dramatic break" with existing
practices and not to mere "minor tinkering." Quantitatively speaking,
most of the proposals echo the recommendations and accomplishments
of the movement for reform in American congressional procedure and
organization-reduction of the number of standing committees,
rationalization of committee jurisdictions, regularizing of committee
hearings and reports, improvement of staff and work facilities, and
so on. At least as important are general recommendations for unharnessing legislative power by elimination of cramping state constitutional limitations-for example, those on the size of the state
debt or on the amount and type of permissible taxation, or those
constitutional declarations of policy which restrict legislative policy
choice. Most striking of all is a plea for unicameralism, together
with suggestions for a system of representation combining singlemember geographical districts and at-large districts on both a statewide and regional basis.
Professor Fordham does not endorse every proposed reform which
1. Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
2. This book was originally delivered as The Edward G. Donnelly Memorial
Lectures at the College of Law of West Virginia University.
3. Akzin, The Concept of Legislation, 21 IowA L. REv. 713 (1936); Cohen,
Toward Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L. Rnv. 886 (1950).
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the examples cited might call to mind. He thinks the legislative
council is a "temporizing device" which can readily be dispensed
with once the legislative institution is properly revamped. Municipal
home rule he sees as an unwise limitation on legislative power.
Popular initiative and referendum he rejects as analogous to the
settlement of a case at law by popular vote. Proportional or functional representation schemes do not meet with his approval.
To anyone familiar with the history of legislative institutions in
general and of American movements for legislative reform in particular these various proposals and the arguments for or against each
of them will no doubt sound like skillfully rendered variations on a
familiar theme. The author's intent, like that of previous familiar
tracts, is to persuade; and the reader is accordingly presented with
a brief drawing on previous arguments in order to state, the best
possible case for the author's side. But Professor Fordham deserves
praise for covering this familiar ground neatly and succinctly: even
though little of what he says there is altogether new, the first twothirds of his slim volume covers most of what occupies volumes of
previous disputation.
The third and final lecture takes up issues which are less familiar
and probably, for the professional reader, considerably more interesting than those just described. Here the author recommends creation (in each legislature) of a "Standing Committee on Sanctions
and Law Enforcement," which should assess the prospects for citizens'
conformity to proposed laws and write into each law the kind of
sanctions that will achieve maximum conformity to it. Especially
when he specifically recognizes that legislators will hereby be forced
to draw upon the knowledge of "behavioral scientists," he encourages
the reader to expect a broad-gauged discussion of the character of
law as a social and political force. Such a discussion has been urged
and initiated before.4 But the expectation is unfortunately never
fulfilled. "Behavioral scientist," it turns out, is a limiting, not an
expansive term, which denotes specifically only psychologists-and
explicitly excludes psychiatrists, whose business is essentially therapy, at that. And even the "psychology" Professor Fordham has in
view is a pretty archaic brand. In both conception and use it is
hardly one step removed from that expounded by Jeremy Bentham
5
in his discussion of sanctions over one hundred years ago.
The most obviously disappointing feature of the discussion of
sanctions, as of the preceding discussion, is its complete reliance upon
the formal kind of deductive analysis used by Bentham and by many
4. Dickinson, Legislation and the Effectiveness of Law, 17 A.B.A.J1 645
(1931).
5. Bentham, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRALS ANm LEGISLATIOx
<1948 ed.).
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American political scientists and reformers. Certain premises which
are crucial to the argument are simply omitted altogether from
consideration. Do legislators really behave differently in a unicameral
than in a bicameral legislature? How? Why? Will they indubitably
base their decisions more rationally on "the facts" if these are
routinely marshalled in orderly committee hearings and fully reported by committees than they do in disorganized chambers without
adequate committees and committee procedures? Will the quality
or content of laws be changed at all if so? How? Questions like
these can legitimately be juxtaposed to every one of the author's
recommendations for change. But it is unquestioningly assumed
throughout that instantaneous alteration in legislators' decision-making behavior, of precisely the kind desired, will follow simply and
directly as a consequence of the institutional, structural and procedural changes. Even though time and space limitations foreclosed
the author from full discussion of such questions, it might at least
have been suggested, by footnote or otherwise, that the problems
are of critical importance to the topic at hand, and that there are
some relevant studies by political scientists, social psychologists and
others which say something about the assumptions.
More specifically, there should at least be some recognition of the
conception of the functions and qualities of law which is implied by
the method and content of the argument. The standards by which
Professor Fordham here judges legislative institutions all look upon
statutes as primarily tools with which judges and lawyers work;
His over-riding goal is to facilitate production of statutes meeting
the standards of consistency, clarity and legal feasibility. An often
used argument, for example, is that some proposed change will result in making the legislative record more complete and more accessible, so that lawyers and judges may more easily determine
legislative intent when they come to apply the statutes to cases.
Doubtless, facilitation of legal application, or rationality of lawyers'
and judges' decisions, are worthy goals. But is not the political function of legislature-made law at least as important? The process of
making the laws and not just the end-product forms of words is what
develops and maintains community-wide consensus about basic principles of justice. Because laws are in large part the outcome of contests among parties and interests they are able to acquire the character
of authoritative rules in the community. In the political sense, the
full character and significance of any law is never wholly encapsuled
in the statutory language. Whatever reformers do to the legislative
process ought to be done with its high political goals and functions
well in mind. Indeed, the purely legal standards of statutory nicety
are justified ultimately by the assumption that they, too, serve these
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higher goals of the legislative process.
It may be that the reforms suggested by Professor Fordham would
contribute to reaching these goals. But he does not tell the reader
whether he thinks they will or not. Though it may be unjust, it is
still quite possible to infer from his book that only the legalistic goals
and standards need be pondered in reforming legislative institutions.
There is a very real danger that reforms undertaken on that basis
could damage or destroy the state legislature as a viable political
instrument.
JOHN C. WAULKM*

AccmENT CASES. By Albert Averbach. Rochester:
Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co. 1958. Pp. xii, 1505.

HAMLING

The

There has been a recent spate of "how to do it" books for plaintiff's
attorneys in personal injury negligence cases. Many are little more
than a rehashing of techniques familiar to any practitioner who has
ever set foot in a court room; of some use, perhaps, to the law student
or recent graduate, but to be employed only as a crutch and cast aside
as soon as one can walk alone. Others describe new and more
effective methods for presenting to the court and jury the plaintiff's
case in graphic and arresting form so as to impress as forcefully as
possible upon the agency which will decide the case the cause and
extent of the injuries involved and the necessity for adequate compensation to plaintiff for them. The present treatise, as its author's
connection with NACCA and other similar organizations dedicated
to "the adequate award" would indicate, belongs to the latter category.
It should be stated, however, that Mr. Averbach's approach is
largely free from the almost hysterical insistence which characterizes
the works of some of his fellow authors in the field that any award
which a jury can be persuaded to give in a personal injury case is
justified, regardless of the means used to achieve it, arising presumably
from the belief that insurance companies and corporations are the
natural prey of the lawyer. True, he devotes a chapter to demonstrative evidence, which, as he points out, is nothing new; and another to
the computation and proof of damages, including the use of mathematical formulae in the area of pain and suffering, a practice which
has been condemned in some states. But he does not advocate
whipping the jury into a frenzy of emotional sympathy for the
plaintiff by means of the former (which frequently results in
nothing more than a mistrial or reversal), or climbing to astronomical
heights by means of the latter (which tends to inspire in the average
* Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University.
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jury the same sense of unreality as does the national debt). Instead
he suggests a more realistic approach, based upon a thorough investigation of the facts leading up to the accident and of the medical
aspects of the injury which resulted from it. The end product which
this produces is an evaluation of both liability and damages which
can be rationally supported at every juncture, and which is therefore most persuasive both to the defendant and his attorney during
settlement negotiations, and to the judge and jury at the trial. And if
a verdict is obtained by these means, it is far more likely to stand up
upon motion for new trial and upon appeal.
Medico-legal technique is Mr. Averbach's forte. Not only does he
devote his longest chapter to it (some 180 pages replete with illustrations), but his book is accompanied by a separately bound supplement
of twenty-one pages, the contents of which are strictly medical in
nature, including eight transparent overlays of the human body
showing its various systems from the skeletal to the muscular, with
the relationship of all of the intervening organs to each and to each
other. In fact this brief supplement constitutes in itself a short
course in anatomy which will be of inestimable value to any practitioner in the field.
Mr. Averbach is a proponent of the medical
brief. This, of course,
is not for the use of the court, but exclusively for that of counsel in
examining and cross-examining expert witnesses and others upon
medical issues in the case. To this limited extent, its utility is obvious.
The attorney who, faced with a cool and self-possessed expert witness,
fumbles among his pile of medical texts and comes up with a halfdigested quotation which can be refuted with a word, could save
himself much embarrassment and possible disaster by briefing the
medical aspects of his case in advance. Here is good advice for both
plaintiffs and defendants, for each will have his own experts to deal
with and each will be faced with those of the other on ground
familiar to the witness but which the lawyer can make his own only
by intensive preparation.
But Mr. Averbach's book is not all devoted to medical proof. There
are chapters on theories of liability, pleadings, discovery procedures,
settlement negotiations, opening statements, the trial, summation, and
the verdict and motions following it; twenty-nine in all, ranging from
the opening interview with the client to the closing statement for
services and expenses after settlement or verdict, both much neglected subjects. Of particular interest is a chapter on the value
of medico-legal seminars and symposiums, which have become an
extremely popular form of continuing legal education. Each chapter
is keyed to appropriate references in A.L.R. and A.L.R.2d, and there
is also included a tabulation of all annotations in the latter series
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dealing with tort procedural and negligence law.
A substantial part of the two volumes is made up of material which
has been previously published but some of which is obtainable elselwhere only with considerable difficulty. The lengthy annotation from
A.L.R.2d 1 (it should by now be apparent that Mr. Averbach's publishers also put out this series) dealing with failure on the part of a
motorist to give a signal for a left turn is reprinted in full, together
with the decision in Morris v. Crumpton2 which it originally followed,
as is the opinion in Smith v. Ohio Oil Co.3 and its following annotation
upon the use of skeletons and similar exhibits for purposes of demonstration at the trial.4 Forms for many purposes are reproduced, including those for use in investigating accidents and interviewing
witnesses as available from two commercial 'companies. Extensive
bibliographies are given, including one of over 240 titles on medical
subjects which the author states are "from the shelves of my personal
library." There are examples of trial briefs in eight different types
of cases, covering over 150 pages; and reprints of no less than twentyseven articles (six of them by Mr. Averbach himself) occupy almost
a third of the total bulk of the book. While this would seem to be
somewhat of a hodge podge of material, Mr. Averbach has succeeded
in relating it through the common theme of trial preparation and
technique, so that the overall effect is of a unified whole rather than
a mere collection of occasional pieces.
The publishers of this treatise make a statement in their foreword with which no lawyer would quarrel. They say: "It is the
duty of plaintiff's counsel to see that plaintiff's case is presented as
forcefully, clearly, and persuasively as possible. Defendant's counsel
must protect his client from both unjustified and exorbitant claims.
To function well in either capacity, the lawyer should be thoroughly
grounded in the law concerned, and in the trial techniques required."
Will Mr. Averbach's book assist in achieving these laudable and
desirable ends? There is reason to think that, if properly used, it will.
It does not contain all the answers; it is doubtful that Mr. Averbach
ever intended that it should. But it does point out many of the
problems to be overcome, the pitfalls to be avoided, and the means
to be utilized in doing so. And if it guides its readers down the path
of thorough legal and factual preparation before and during trial,
it will have performed a service to them and to the public for which
its author is entitled to be congratulated.
WALTm P. ARmsTmONG, JR.*

1. Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 65 (1955).

2. 259 Ala. 565, 67 So. 2d 800 (1953).

2d 67, 134 N.E.2d 526 (1956).
4. Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 689 (1958).

3. 10 Ill. App.

* Member, Armstrong, McCadden, Allen, Braden, & Goodman, Memphis,
Tennessee.

